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EDUCATIONAL FINANCING IN NEW JERSEY:
ROBINSON V. CAHILL AND BEYOND
Harold J.Ruvoldt, Jr.*
These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who
already have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.'

With these words, Justice Powell writing in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,2 rejected a challenge to the present

method of funding public education in the state of Texas. The primary argument advanced was that the existing financing system, based
on local property taxes, was violative of the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution.3 But even before the commentators
had an opportunity to analyze this long awaited decision, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey struck down a similar tax scheme in Robinson v.
Cahill.4 Although superficially, the decisions appear to conflict, the
rationale for rejecting the financing system in Robinson emerges from
a state constitutional mandate "for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools,"3 and not from
the federal equal protection provision rejected in Rodriguez.
I.

INTRODUCTnON

Robinson was the culmination of a movement which had its inception in Brown v. Board of Education.6 In Brown, the Supreme
* A.B., St. Peter's College; J.D., Seton Hall University; Member, New Jersey
Mr. Ruvoldt represented the plaintiffs in Robinson v. Cahill.
1 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973)
phasis added).
2 411 US. 1 (1973).
8 Id. at 17.
4 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, supplemented, 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289
569 (L. Div. 1972), aff'd as modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, supplemented, 63
196, 306 A.2d 65, cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1973).
5 N.J. CONsT. art. 8, § 4, g 1.
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Bar.
(em-

A.2d
N.J.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

Court found that a racially segregated school system provided educational facilities to participating students which were, by their very na7
ture, inherently unequal.
In the years since Brown, the civil rights movement was concerned primarily with the establishment of a unitary system of public
education and did not foster challenges against educational deprivation
based on other classifications. Therefore, it was not until 1968 that
public attention was focused in this new direction.
The first such challenge was launched in Michigan, but the suit
was dismissed by a county court for lack of prosecution.8 Shortly thereafter, in Mclnnis v. Shapiro,9 the existing system of school financing
was challenged in Illinois. McInnis advanced the argument that the
equal protection and due process clauses of the United States Constitution require that monies allocated to public education be dispensed on the criterion of educational needs. 10 More specifically, it
was urged that the Illinois system of financing schools, which depended heavily on local property valuations and locally determined
tax rates, was irrational, and that potential alternatives would better
serve the purposes of the legislation." The federal district court found
that the "need" standard espoused by plaintiff was not judicially manageable because the court could not provide the empirical data and
consultation necessary for intelligent educational planning. 2 The
7 Id. at 495.
8 Board of Educ. v. Michigan, No. 103342 (Wayne County Ct., filed Feb. 2, 1968).
Despite the dismissal for failure to prosecute, Governor Milliken ultimately brought a
successful suit on an identical issue in Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457
(1972), rehearing granted, Jan. 30, 1973. The Michigan legislature has enacted, and the
Governor has signed into law, Pub. Act No. 101 (Aug. 14, 1973) which deals with school
district financing. The promulgation of this law may render Milliken moot.
9 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), afi'd per curiam sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 322 (1969).
,10 293 F. Supp. at 329 & n.4. Educational need is a term of art depicting the interrelationship of such factors as teacher quality and experience, student potential and
prior education, parental background and education, and the physical environment
including the tangible educational plant. Id. at 329 n.4.
11 Id. at 331.
12 Id. at 335-36. Educational need is an attractive standard because it is qualitative
and is therefore more related to scholastic success than the quantitative financial
standard. It also obviates the doubts associated with the cost-quality ratios and other
inputs used as measures of quality raised in Coleman, The Concept of Equality of
Educational Opportunity, 38 HAxv. Enuc. Rv. 7, 18-19 (1968). Such a standard would
not conflict with the compensatory education concept. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401, 469-73 (D.D.C. 1967), remanded sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
The principal problem with utilizing the need standard is the difficulty of determining the level at which the school system will be constitutionally compelled to
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court was also of the opinion that if these sweeping changes were to
be made, the proper branch of government to do so would be the
legislature. 13
Following the unsuccessful Mclnnis challenge, a group of plaintiffs filed a similar suit in Virginia entitled Burruss v. Wilkerson."4 In
order to circumvent the pitfalls encountered in Mclnnis, these plaintiffs opted for an equally novel, but more manageable standard for determining financial contributions to education. They argued that equal
instructional and physical facilities should be afforded each child attending the state's public school system. 15 Although sympathetic to this
approach, the court found this "scarcely distinguishable" from the
Mclnnis argument, and that outlays for one group of school children
were not invidiously greater than that of any other.'8 The suit was dismissed, the court indicating that a state legislative remedy would undoubtedly be forthcoming to alleviate the admitted scholastic inequali7
ties.1
Until 1969, most meaningful litigation in this area had been
remedy an inadequate need situation. See Alexander & Jordan, Constitutional Alternatives
for State School Support, in FINANCING EDUCATON 470, 491-93 (R. Johns, K. Alexander
& F. Jordan ed. 1972). Fiscal neutrality, or equal educational dollars per pupil, appears
more palatable to scholars. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A
Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. Rav. 305, 39495 (1969). However, the fiscal neutrality approach does not promise an equal education
from the scholastic achievement standpoint. It is the author's view that the use of some
viable qualitative standard is necessary to assure equal opportunity in public education, be it mandated through a specific state constitutional provision, or by implication
as suggested in Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 57-59 (1969).
18 293 F. Supp. at 336-37.
14 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
15 310 F. Supp. at 574. The concept of "equal facilities" encompasses more than
the physical plant, but includes equality in all the tangibles recognized by the courts
in the traditional educational segregation context. See United States v. Board of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1966) (footnote omitted).
The United States Constitution, as construed in Brown, requires public school
systems to integrate students, faculties, facilities, and activities.
Equal facilities provide a realistic legislative or judical standard because it is
susceptible to measurement. Compare Bowles & Levin, The Determinants of Scholastic
Achievement-An Appraisal of Some Recent Evidence, 3 J. HUMAN RES. 3, 7-17 (1968)
with Hirsch, Determinants of Public Education Expenditures, 13 NAT'L TAX J. 29, 36
(1960). It is obvious that there is a direct relationship between the provision of educational facilities and the dollars allocated and spent for their acquisition. Even when
ignoring operating expenditures, capital costs alone can present enormous problems to
low ratable communities. See C. BENSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 235-36,
241 (2d ed. 1968).
16 310 F. Supp. at 574.
17 Id.
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argued in the federal courts. The only notable exception was the California challenge of Serrano v. Priest.' Initially, the suit was dismissed
at the trial level for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. 19 On appeal, the California supreme court reversed, holding that public school financing which creates disparities among individual school districts in the amount of revenue available for education, violates the equal protection provisions of both the federal and
state constitutions.

II.

20

THE NEw JERSEY TRIAL STRATEGY

During the pendency of the Serrano appeal, a similar suit attacking the method of funding public education was filed in New Jersey.
The New Jersey plaintiffs had a decided advantage in their choice of
forum. The state supreme court had recognized "the education of
children to be of supreme importance," 21 and that "the State's duty to
educate children is a matter of constitutional demand." 22 The New
Jersey constitution contains a specific directive that:
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the2 3children in the State between the ages of five
and eighteen years.
Cognizant of the special position that education occupies in New
Jersey, and of the constitutional requirement of the provision of a
"thorough and efficient" education, the plaintiffs were able to formulate their manner of attack. They realized that fundamental constitutional law dictates that a constitutional challenge in a state court exposes to review, constitutional issues of both state and federal dimension. Therefore, if the federal attack in the state court system failed,
the state challenge could still succeed. Also, a similar suit heard in a
federal court might be hampered by the doctrine of federal abstention,
if state constitutional issues had not yet been resolved by that state's
courts. 24 In order to avoid the unfavorable results of prior educational
18 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
19 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
20 5 Cal. 3d at 596 & n.l, 619, 487 P.2d at 1249 & n.11, 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609
& n.11, 626.
21 Pingry Corp. v. Township of Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 460, 217 A.2d 868, 870 (1966)
(action by private school seeking tax exemption); State v. Vaughn, 44 N.J. 142, 145, 207
A.2d 537, 539 (1965) (disorderly person's prosecution brought against parent for failure
to send child to school).
22 46 N.J. at 461, 217 A.2d at 870.
23 N.J. CONsr. art. 8, § 4,
1.
24 See generally C. WRucrr, FEnaAL COURTS § 52, at 196-97 (2d ed. 1970).
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litigation, it. was decided to utilize a series of alternate constitutional
attacks upon the existing school funding system rather than to rely on
25
a singular approach.
Choice of party plaintiffs was then resolved. Kenneth Robinson,
a youngster from Jersey City, represented the pupils of the state's public schools. 26 Educational administrators were included because of their
responsibilities for delivering the public educational offering. Local
taxpayers were added because educational funding is derived primarily
through municipal realty taxes. Each plaintiff was named both as an
individual and as a representative of his respective class. 27 This approach enabled all persons affected by educational finance and its
delivery to be represented in some capacity. Every state official and
official body involved with the state educational system and its delivery
of services was named as a defendant. 2 Since a new governor had taken
office shortly before the suit was filed, the litigation took his name, and
29
the case was captioned Robinson v. Cahill.
In the complaint, the students challenged the constitutionality of
the present educational financing system as a denial of equal protection. They alleged that under the existing law they were being discriminated against because of their race and their economic status.30

25 The permissibility of alternative and inconsistent pleadings for relief as provided by N.J.R. 4:5-2, 4:5-6 was a necessity in a suit of Robinson's nature. As with
alternative counts in an indictment, such pleading prevents the evil being attacked from
eluding capture due to an error in legal theory at the outset.
26 Robinson possessed the essential characteristics necessary to properly test the
school funding issue. He was a bright child attending a school which was severely
overcrowded and grossly under-equipped.
27 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 1-8, Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 225,
287 A.2d 187 (L. Div. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint]. The
class action approach was adopted so that the entire system of funding education
throughout the state could be attacked, rather than the system of any one individual
district. Also, since plaintiffs anticipated a long period of litigation, the class action
forestalled any issue of mootness upon the graduation of the named plaintiff.
28 Education in New Jersey is regulated by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:1-1 et seq. (1968).
While education has an independent basis of power, and a separate corporate existence,
its powers and financing are intimately interwoven with municipal government; thus
there was a need for an exhaustive listing of plaintiffs and defendants.
The litigation was essentially non-partisan, as the two cities that were initial
plaintiffs (Jersey City and Paterson) were at the outset of the litigation, governed by a
Democrat and by a Republican, respectively. Both Plainfield and East Orange which subsequently joined the litigation, were also governed by opposing political parties.
29 118 N.J. Super. 225, 287 A.2d 187, supplemented, 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569
(L. Div. 1972), afl'd as modified, 62 N.J. 475, 305 A.2d 273, supplemented, 63 N.J. 196, 306
A.2d 65, cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1975).
80 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra note 27, at 14. Plaintiffs took a voluntary
dismissal on the racial issues of the complaint, rather than combine white-black tensions
with the already volatile rich-poor, urban-suburban dichotomies. Subsequent to the
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The students further claimed that the state constitutional guarantee
of a "thorough and efficient education" had not been met.3 '
The theory of the taxpayers was also denial of equal protection,
as well as a denial of state affirmative tax guarantees. Taxpayers in
various districts were being taxed unequally for the common state purpose of education. 2 They also alleged that an ad valorem property tax
as a method of public school financing was confiscatory, denying the
taxpayers the right to select a tax base proportionate to the importance
33
which they placed upon their children's educational experience.
The educational administrators attacking the system of school
funding used a different tactic. They maintained that the present system of local control of education constituted an improper delegation
of a state legislative duty, in the absence of standards properly limiting
84
the power granted to local communities.
Plaintiffs demanded both declaratory and injunctive relief. They
sought orders compelling educational restructuring and redistricting,
as well as the enjoinment of the existing tax law-at least until a reapportionment of the tax proceeds could be exacted. Additionally, the
85
plaintiffs sought such other relief as the court deemed appropriate.
Thus, the court could find the system unconstitutional, and yet permit
its operation until it had been restructured.
The arguments advanced by plaintiffs were predicated upon the
assumption that there is a direct correlation between the amount spent
on education, and the educational benefits afforded a student. While
this cost-quality relationship had long been accepted by educators, it
was necessary for the Robinson plaintiffs to prove it judicially. 86
institution of the suit, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Mexican-American
racial discrimination argument raised in Rodriguez. 411 U.S. at 57 & n.113.
81 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra note 27, at 37.
82

Id. at 33-35.

83

Id. at 43, 53-54, 57-58.

84 Id. at 21-22.

Id. at 15-64.
86 j. GuTBRE, G. KLEimDOR.mt H. LLVIN & R. SToUr, ScHooLs AND INEQuALrry 92-99,
210-17 (1969); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 12, at 310-11 & n.16.
However, a recent study conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievements indicated that discrepancies in school performance
may be more directly related to student home environment than school quality. The
study also indicated that the child may be a product of his entire past, i.e., his own,
his parents', and his teachers'. This factor may have a greater influence on total student
achievement than any other. The students' past may play more of a role in reading,
literature, and civics, while the school environment may have more of an impact in
science and foreign languages. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1973, at 59, col. 1.
For studies which question the validity of the cost-quality relationship in educational opportunity, see Carrington, On Egalitarian Overzeal: A Polemic Against the Local
85
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It was not difficult to establish that gross deficiencies exist in educational opportunities. Statistics indicate that statewide per year in
the late 1960's, 70,000 children with little or no English-speaking ability attended English-speaking schools, that at least 12,000 children
dropped out of school each year, and that 37,000 or more children
were "educated" in substandard classrooms.3 7 Even more pertinent
were the facts that 30,000 New Jersey children of school age suffered
from a mental or physical handicap, and that 180,000 school children
8
lived in an environment describable only as financially deprived.
The more difficult task was to prove convincingly, through competent evidence, the more subtle deprivations inherent in the existing
system: the inadequate capital facilities, the extreme shortage of library facilities, and the general lack of special education personnel.
All of these, plaintiffs argued, were contributing reasons for the totally
deficient education offered to various school children, resulting in their
becoming what has been called "functional illiterates."3 9
Initially plaintiffs planned to impress upon the court the severity
of these conditions. They attempted to achieve this by citing examples
and statistics of known educational deprivations. Realizing the impact
of strategically selected raw data on the court, plaintiffs solicited expert
testimony. 40 These experts introduced into evidence vast amounts of
factual data, which transformed into stark reality, a telling portrait of
educational deprivation. The data presented by these experts, although
not specifically obtained in New Jersey, was relevant because of its
School Property Tax Cases, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 232, 239-41; Schoettle, The Equal Protection
Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1355, 1378-81, 1387-88 (1971); Orrca OF
EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 296 (1966).
37 Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents at 34-35, Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303

A.2d 273 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondents].
88 Id. at 35.
89 The term has been developed in a 1962 UNESCO definition:
A person is literate when he has acquired the essential knowledge and skills
which enable him to engage in all those activities in which literacy is required
for effective functioning in his group and community, and whose attainments in
reading, writing and arithmetic make it possible for him to continue to use these
skills towards his own and the community's development.
Harman, Illiteracy: An Overview, 40 HAsv. Enuc. REv. 226, 227 (1970) (footnote omitted).
Both the United States Bureau of the Census, and the United States Army have set a
fifth-grade equivalency to distinguish functional literates. Id.
40 Robinson experts, Doctors Henry M. Levin and James W. Guthrie, participated
in a 1969 study of socio-economic status and educational opportunity, which took as its
starting point the school system of the state of Michigan. Their report substantiated the
Robinson plaintiffs' cost-quality theory. J. GUTHRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEVIN & R.
STOUT, supra note 36, at 176, 210-17.
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broad implications for the educational system in the entire nation, and
41
was therefore susceptible to application in this state.
The oral testimony of plaintiffs' experts was buttressed by the
admission into evidence of various reports of governmental agencies
and commissions. 42 These studies included the evaluation of the educational systems of cities of such varied geographic and economic character as Auburn, Alabama; New York, New York; Terre Haute, Indiana; and Oakland, California. These reports substantiated plaintiffs' theory that additional dollars injected into an educational system
would tend to upgrade the achievement of students participating
within it. 4 3 Several New Jersey studies were also offered into evidence

which compared schools with various levels of funding per pupil."
This data substantially corresponded with the cost-quality correlation
indicated in the national reports.
Another proof that plaintiffs considered necessary to their cause
was the ability to establish a realistic standard of educational output
which could provide a basis for comparison of various school districts
and their relative success in providing quality education. Plaintiffs
chose a series of studies of New Jersey school districts which demonstrated a positive correlation between the land wealth of a district and
the percentage of college-bound students within it, as well as their
41 The impact of teacher-pupil ratio class size, teaching staff size, experience and
attitudes of teachers, and the age and condition of the school's physical plant on the
effectiveness of school services has been the subject of studies throughout the country.
See, e.g., J. GuTHmE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEVIN & R. STOuT, supra note 36, at 92-145.
These same factors are demonstrably present in New Jersey. This research, indicating
that these schools' service components do make a difference in determining the quality
of a child's education, was relevant to plaintiffs' claimed absence of a thorough and
efficient education.
42 These studies were conducted in various cities and towns throughout the country
by independent researchers under contract with the Office of Education, United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The published reports covered preschool
programs in compensatory education, elementary programs in compensatory education,
elementary-secondary programs in compensatory education, and secondary programs in
compensatory education. These reports are known as the "IT WORKS" series published
by the Office of Education, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, during 1969-70.
43 These studies indicated a significant improvement in the educational attainment
of disadvantaged children participating in the specially funded compensatory education
programs. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE AMELIORATIVE
PRESCHOOL PROGRAM, CHAMPAIGN, ILLINOIS 5-6 (It Works Series No. 1, 1969); HOMEWORK
HELPER PROGRAM, NEW YORK CITY 10-14 (It Works Series No. 3, 1970).
44 See, e.g., Report of the State Committee to Study the Next Steps of Regionaliza.
tion and Consolidation in the School Districts of New Jersey App. B (State of New
Jersey, Department of Education, April 2, 1969) (citing Engelhardt, Engelhardt & Legget,
Pilot Study of School District Reorganization, State of New Jersey 28-44 (Committee to
Study the Next Steps of Regionalization and Consolidation in the School Districts of
New Jersey, Jan., 1968)).
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relative achievement on the scholastic aptitude tests. 45 This evidence
demonstrated the relationship between the number of dollars spent
for education and its quality. Moreover, it indicated that the dollar
theory propounded by plaintiffs was not unique to a specific type of
school district, but rather was universal to cities, rural areas, and sub46
urban communities alike.

Having established the fundamental relationship between educational cost and quality, the next task was to demonstrate the correlation
between parent or, in the aggregate, community wealth and the
amount of funds available for public education. It was not difficult to
substantiate that monies derived from the so-called "Bateman formula, ' 47 New Jersey's plan of state funding of education, represented
the sole source of state revenue.
The espoused purpose of the Bateman Commission, a group created to recommend school financing legislative reform, was to develop
a plan which would bring individual district spending to a point
where a basic minimum of funds would be provided for educational
functions. 48 The formula as adopted, utilized several complex calculations which attempted to enable a school district to spend at least a
49
minimum amount of funds per pupil, regardless of district wealth.
These calculations purported to take into consideration such factors
as student grade levels, as well as socio-economic levels, in determining
the dollars needed to supply this desired minimal level of education. 50
The formula also included a provision for encouraging individual
districts to contribute additional local funds in order to provide for an
improved educational offering. The district was permitted to raise
these extra dollars by fixing a higher local property tax rate to be paid
by the district's residents.5 1 The plan provided that a wealthy district,
45 The performance of students from Millburn, Princeton, Englewood, Bloomfield,
and Belleville were compared with those of Newark, Trenton, Camden, Jersey City, and
Paterson. The results indicated that top achievers came from those school districts which
spent more dollars. Significantly, these dollars were obtained with a lower tax rate as a
consequence of those districts' high valued ratables. Brief for Respondents, Appendix,
supra note 37, at 115a-23a (Analysis of Educational Testing Service Studies).
46 62 N.J. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277. Although the Robinson court accepted the costquality theory, it is clear that the Rodriguez Court was not convinced that such a
relationship exists. 411 U.S. at 42-43 & n.86.
47 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973-74). This statute is officially entitled the "State School Incentive Equalization Aid Law."
48 A State School Support Program for New Jersey 5 (State of New Jersey, State Aid
to School Districts Study Commission, Dec. 19, 1968).
49 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-5 (Supp. 1973-74).
50 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-2 (Supp. 1973-74).
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-5(b)(2) (Supp. 1973-74).
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one which could easily raise the required dollar per pupil expenditure
through property taxation, would receive only a minimum state-aid
grant. 52 However, a poorer district, one which could not so easily raise
the required dollars per pupil, would receive the minimum state-aid
grant as well as an additional state stipend to compensate for the
deficiency. 58
As enacted, an additional factor in the plan was its "save harmless" provision.. This clause provided that any district receiving more
money under the previous state funding program would continue to
54
get that higher figure over the first year of Bateman's implementation.
The Bateman formula was funded at a 20 per cent level at the
time of its implementation in 1970-71. That percentage was to be increased at the rate of an additional 20 per cent per year. 55 Fully funded,
the plan would have provided that the state contribute 40 per cent,
the federal government 5 per cent, and local government 55 per cent
of the total cost of public education in the 1971-72 academic year.56
However, without full funding, during the 1971-72 academic year, the
state actually contributed 28 per cent, the federal government 5 per
57
cent, and local government contributed a full 67 per cent of the total.
In an effort to persuasively illustrate the actual impact of the
Bateman formula, the Robinson plaintiffs offered into evidence an exhibit indicating conditions in grossly disparate school districts. 5 The
exhibit, which demonstrated some of the inherent inequalities in the
formula, made a comparison between Jersey City, a low to moderate
income urban community, and Millburn, an affluent suburban community. For example, in order to permit an expenditure of $969 per
pupil in Jersey City, that city would have to tax its residents at the
rate of $2.28 per $100 of assessed valuation, whereas Millburn's tax
rate need only be $1.41 per $100 of assessed valuation to permit a per
pupil expenditure of $1,610.59
Additional exhibits were admitted which included data on local
educational expenditures and tax rates which illustrated the inevitability of unequal educational opportunities resulting from heavy reliance
52 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-5(b)(1) (Supp. 1973-74).
58 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-5(b)(2) (Supp. 1973-74).
54 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-18.1 (Supp. 1973-74).
55 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-18.1 (Supp. 1972-73), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:58-18.1 (Supp. 1973-74).
50 62 N.J. at 517, 303 A.2d at 296; 118 N.J. Super. at 231, 287 A.2d at 191.
57 118 N.J. Super. at 231, 287 A.2d at 191.
58 Brief for Respondents, supra note 37, at 29-30.

69

Id.
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on local property tax revenues.6 0 The necessity for offering an acceptable educational opportunity to students was made clear through a
state educational survey.61 The report concluded that:
If the graduates of our school systems are to survive in this
society, they must be able to read well, think well, and work well.
These are skills which, traditionally, are provided in large part by
the public schools. These skills are not being provided for a large
enough proportion of Camden's students.
Not only are most students behind the national norms in reading, but some students are illiterate.
emNot only are some students unable to obtain meaningful
62
ployment upon graduation, but many never graduate.
Affidavits of educators employed by various urban educational systems
were offered to substantiate the general applicability of the report's
conclusion. These affiants courageously admitted that their respective
schools were providing an unsatisfactory education to participating
students and each concluded that the inability of the community to
eradicate these inadequacies constituted a serious educational deprivation to many students. 63
The evidence concerning the cost-quality relationship supported
the proposition that the dollar amount available for a pupil's education is dictated to a large degree by his socio-economic status. This
financial factor affects not only the quality of the school, but also the
pupil's school achievement and his socio-economic status after graduation. A seemingly unalterable cycle is created when the graduated
pupil procreates a new generation of students who bear the same socioeconomic characteristics of their parents, and who then are precluded
from achieving upward social mobility by their lack of educational
opportunities.64
Upon consideration of this evidence, the trial court in Robinson
determined that the present system of financing schools was violative
of both state and federal equal protection guarantees."3 In addition, it
concluded that the state constitutional directive of supplying a "thorough and efficient education" to school children had not been met.63
60 Id., Appendix, at lOa-33a.
61 A Survey of the Camden City Public Schools (New Jersey Department of Educa.

tion, November, 1969).
62 Id., Part One, at 11-5.
63 Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Appendix, at 186a-213a, 235a-47a, 351a-58a, Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
64 J. Gtrrntm, G. KLEONDORFER, H. LIWN & R. STouT, supra note 56, at 174-76.
65 118 N.J. Super. at 275, 287 A.2d at 214.
66 Id. at 270, 287 A.2d at 211.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed but modified
the trial court's decision, limiting the holding of unconstitutionality
7
to the state's failure to satisfy the "thorough and efficient" guarantee.1
III.

EQUAL PROTECTION AND EQUAL EDUCATION

In determining whether a statute is unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds, the courts have exercised restraint based upon the
traditional judicial presumption of the constitutionality of the legislative action. 8 Normally, when the court is able to find a rational basis
for the statute's resultant unequal treatment or classification, the statute will withstand attack. Approximately 70 years after the Supreme Court initially construed the equal protection clause, 69 it determined that a further inquiry into the character of the interest invaded
by the statute was a proper judicial exercise. 70 While the Court continued to apply the rational basis test in most instances, it applied a
more stringent standard to justify the state's action where a fundamental right was infringed.71 The Court required a showing of a
''compelling state interest" where there was a denial of such a right.
This approach was utilized not only in conjunction with those rights
enumerated in the Constitution, it also found application to those interests which were implicitly guaranteed as well. 72 In the nearly 30
62 N.J. at 490, 499-500, 515-16, 303 A.2d at 281-82, 286-87, 295.
68 See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). The Court in
this case set down the guidelines to which the judiciary should adhere when determining whether a statute was violative of the equal protection clause. Id. It further
recognized a presumption in favor of reasonableness of legislative classifications. If any
state of facts can reasonably be construed to justify the classification, the Court will assume such facts to be the basis for the classification, and thus uphold the statute. Id.
at 78.
69 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
70 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Court struck down an
Oklahoma statute which authorized the sterilization of habitual criminals because it was
written in a manner that promoted inequality of treatment between persons in the
habitual criminal classification. Id. at 537-38. This was the first case to discuss the concept of fundamental rights (i.e., the right of marriage and procreation).
71 Id. at 541. See also Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625-30
(1969), wherein the Court held invalid a law purporting to restrict the right to vote in a
local school district election to those who had children attending local schools, or who
owned or leased a property in the school district.
72 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). The Court held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute which denied welfare assistance to residents of the
state who had not resided within its jurisdiction for at least one year immediately prior
to applying for benefits. Id. at 621-22. Justice Brennan found that the statute abridged
the fundamental right of persons to move freely from state to state. Id. at 629-31. The
Court also held that where a classification is based on suspect criteria or involves a
fundamental right, it must not only meet the standard of reasonableness, but must further
be shown necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Id. at 634. See also Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
67
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years since the acceptance of this "compelling state interest" approach,
the criterion triggering its application has been expanded from interference with fundamental interests to include "suspect classifications,"
e.g., race, 73 alienage, 74 or national origin.7 5 Thus, an attack on an educational funding system as a denial of equal protection would require
a determination that education is a fundamental interest, or that the
quality of education dispensed by the state was determined on the basis
of a suspect classification.
Discrimination on the basis of wealth has increasingly received
the treatment accorded previously determined suspect classifications. 76
Closer scrutiny can be justified because classifications based upon
affluence or indigency may be grounded upon capricious and irrelevant
factors. The quality of education is clearly related to the funds available for its delivery. Where a funding system is based upon local real
property taxes, the educational quality received (as measured by dollar
input) is determined on the basis of the wealth of the district. The
result is an educational system founded on the capricious criteria inherent in a classification based on wealth.
Such classifications have been found to constitute a denial of equal
protection both in the contexts of voting rights7 7 and criminal indigency.7 s These are now firmly established areas of fundamental inter73 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (the Court voided a Virginia statute
that prohibited interracial marriages). See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92
(1964) (the Court invalidated a Florida statute prohibiting interracial nighttime cohabitation between unmarried couples while not restricting cohabitation between other unmarried couples).
74 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). The case concerned an Arizona
statute which sought to limit welfare benefits to its citizens, and exclude resident aliens.
Id. at 367. The Court held that the preservation of fiscal integrity is not a compelling
state interest that could justify a classification which was inherently suspect. See also In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 2851, 2854-55 (1973) (Connecticut court rule excluding
resident aliens from admission to bar unconstitutional); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948).
75 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948). The Court held that California's
Alien Land Law, as applied in this case, unconstitutionally discriminated against an
American minor citizen of Japanese ancestry. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
76 See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1971) (imposition of jail sentence in
lieu of payment of fine); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668
(1966) (invalidating state poll tax); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (denial
of counsel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956) (denial of trial transcript on appeal). See generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (requiring payment of court fees by indigents before being permitted access to court for a
divorce held denial of due process). But see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446
(1973) (filing fee requirement for indigent's voluntary petition in bankruptcy not violative of equal protection).
77 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668 (1966).
78 See cases cited note 76 supra.
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ests. The status of education as a fundamental right is not so clear.7 9
However, the importance of education to the individual in modern
society is indisputable since the quality of education is an important
determinant of one's chances for economic and social success. Moreover, the influence of education on the citizen's participation and effectiveness as part of the democratic process demonstrates its value to
society at large. Voting, recognized as a fundamental interest, is directly affected by the citizen's educational level and his concomitant
ability to understand and deal intelligently with public issues. Unequal education may produce a citizen less likely to maximize his potential in leading a productive and creative life. Such factors suggest
that education should be a fundamental right of the individual.80
The suspect classification of wealth, and the fundamental interest
in education overlap where an educational system is financed through
local property taxes. The question presented is whether the right to
learn is less precious than the right to vote, or the right of access to
the judicial system.
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected
the argument that education is entitled to strict scrutiny under the
federal equal protection clause. 1 It concluded that there were no
grounds for finding discrimination based on wealth in this case, and
that education is not a "fundamental right."8 12 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey agreed in Robinson that Rodriguez precluded their finding
that federal equal protection guarantees had been violated,m but expressly left open the question of whether state equal protection guar79 Until Rodriguez, the Supreme Court had never squarely faced the issue of whether
education was a fundamental right. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954),
the Court recognized that:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.
The Rodriguez Court rejected the lower court's holding that education is a fundamental
right:
We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have
found those arguments unpersuasive.
411 U.S. at 37.
80 The Supreme Court of California in Serrano, had concluded that education was
deserving of protection as a fundamental interest. 5 Cal. 3d at 604-10, 487 P.2d at 125559, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-19. The Rodriguez Court rejected this finding, at least for federal

equal protection purposes. See note 79 supra.
81 411 US. at 40.
82 Id. at 28, 37.
83 62 N.J. at 490, 303 A.2d at 281-82.
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antees had been met,8 4 indicating that state guarantees may be more
demanding than those of the federal constitution.85 Therefore, it would
seem that the state equal protection argument could provide a valid
basis for attacking school financing systems, and that a federal attack
might succeed if it were found that some children within a state were
not receiving an "adequate" education. 86
IV.

A

SPECTRUM OF ANALYSIS

A fuller understanding of the holding and significance of Robinson v. Cahill can be achieved by comparing it with the two other leading decisions on educational funding: Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District87 and Serrano v. Priest."" Collectively, these
three cases illustrate the full breadth and scope of approach and analysis which a court may follow. They are also indicative of the problems
and complexities that litigation of this nature involves.
At one end of the "spectrum" is Rodriguez. The complaint was
filed in a federal district court alleging that the quality of public education in Texas suffered because the present system of financing schools
discriminated against the economically poorer school districts. 89 The
plaintiffs claimed that this discrimination constituted a violation of
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. The
critical characteristic of Rodriguez is that the equal protection claims
of the plaintiffs arose solely out of the United States Constitution.9 0
84 Id. at 500, 303 A.2d at 287. "In these circumstances we will not pursue the equal
protection issue in the limited context of public education." Id.
85 Id. at 490, 303 A.2d at 282. The court reasoned that all essential municipal
services such as police and fire protection might be affected by this state equal protection
analysis. Id. at 495-98, 303 A.2d at 284-86.
86 The Rodriguez plaintiffs never effectively rebutted defendant's assertions that
children within the state were receiving an adequate education. 411 U.S. at 24. This may
have been fatal to their success in the suit. The Court indicated that an inadequate
education might be constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 36-37. Therefore, if it can be
proved in future litigation that some minimal quantum of education is not being received by complaining students, a federal equal protection argument might prevail.
87 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
88 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
89 411 U.S. at 4-6.
90 Id. at 17. Conceivably, there is an independent state constitutional ground upon
which a challenge to the Texas financing scheme could have been brought. Such a suit
would be similar in nature to the qualitative guarantee in New Jersey's constitution
upon which Robinson was argued. The Texas provision, TEX. CONsT. art. 7, § 1, states:
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the
-liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the
State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance
of an efficient system of public free schools.
Other explicit qualitative educational guarantees are contained in at least fourteen
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Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to discredit or refute the state's assertion that virtually all children attending public schools in Texas were
receiving adequate educations. 91
The Rodriguez plaintiffs sued as individuals and as a class representing Mexican-American school children who were members of
low-income families.92 The trial strategy consisted of an attempt to draw
comparisons between the available dollar input of the school districts
which plaintiffs attended, and the Alamo Heights Independent School
District, which was characterized as the most affluent district in the
San Antonio area.98 The strategy failed.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, held that the Texas system
of funding public education, albeit imperfect, bore a rational relationship to the legitimate state purpose of providing education to resident
children of school age. 94 The Court declined to apply the strict scrutiny test to the funding plan, finding that the present system did "not
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class." 95 It concluded that the present system provided "no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights." 96 Consequently, the Court applied the less stringent rational basis test in assessing the Texas
other state constitutions. ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; DEL. CONST.
art. 10, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2-6401; IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 1; ILL. CONsT. art. i0,
§ 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; MD. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; OHIO CONST.
art. VI, § 2; PA. CONsr. art. 3, § 14; VA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. 12, § 1.
Thirteen other state constitutions contain provisions which indicate either a need
for quality education, or the importance of a uniform educational system. ARIz. CONST.
art. XI, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. 12, § 1; IND. CONsT. art. 8, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
MONT. CONST. art. 10, § 1; NEv. CONsr. art. 11, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; ORE. CONST.
art. VIII, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. 9,
§ 2; WIs. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYo. CONsT. art. 7, § 1.
Twenty-two state constitutions have no guarantee as to the quality of education. ALA.
CONST. art. 14, § 256; ALAS. CONST. art. VII, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 9, § 5; CONN. CONST.
art. 8, § I; HAWAII CONST. art. IX, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. 9, § 12; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1;
LA. CONST. art. 12, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MAss. CONST. chap. V, § 91; MIcH. CONST.
art. 8, § 2; MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 1(a); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 6;
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.Y. CoNsT. art. 11, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 147; OKLA.
CONST. art. 13, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. 12, § 1; S.C. CONsT. art. 11; TENN. CONST, art. 11, § 12;
VT. CoNsT. art. ch. II, § 64.
91 411 U.S. at 24.
92 Id. at 4-5.
93 Id. at 11-13. Comparing the least with the most affluent districts in San Antonio
served to illustrate both the manner in which a dual system of finance operates, and the
extent to which substantial disparities exist despite the state's impressive progress in recent years. In the predominantly Mexican-American Edgewood District, the average as.
sessed property value per pupil was $5,960, as compared with $49,000 in the Alamo
Heights District. Id.
94 Id. at 54-55.
95 Id. at 28.
96 Id. at 37.
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funding scheme, and upheld the constitutionality of the plan.97 The
Court found the problem of educational financial reform to be sui
generis, and thus not easily subjected to conventional constitutional
analysis. 98 However, the Court in rejecting a strict scrutiny approach,
concluded that it was "unwilling to assume for [itself] a level of.wisdom
superior to that of . . . educational authorities in 50 States." 99
[T]he Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise
decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public
revenues. 100
While the Court rejected the application of strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause of the federal constitution, it did not foreclose the issues that could be raised in a state where the funding of
public education was found to inherently deprive children of an "adequate" education. 01' Moreover, the Court recognized that a total denial of education might be actionable while a relative exclusion would
02

not.1

The first significant state educational funding case, Serrano v.
Priest,03 stands between Rodrzguez and Robinson both in terms of
analysis and disposition. In reversing a dismissal for failure to state a
claim,'10 4 the Supreme Court of California considered public school
financing in the light of both federal and state constitutional principles.

05

While rejecting the contention that the state constitutional provision of "a system of common schools"' 0 6 required equal educational
financing, the court concluded that there may be both state and federal equal protection denials resulting from financing schools through
10 7
property tax income.
The court held education so "crucial to participation in, and
the functioning of, a democracy"'10 8 that it merited treatment as a
97 Id. at 40, 55.
98 Id. at 18.
99 Id. at 55.
100 Id. at 41.
101 Id. at 36-37.
102 Id.
103 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.
104 Id. at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr.
105 Id. at 597 & n.11, 487 P.2d at 1249 & n.l,
106 Id. at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal.

601 (1971).
at 626.
96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 & n.1l.
Rptr. at 609. See CAL. CONST. art.

9, §5.
107 5 Cal. 3d at 597 n.11, 618-19, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.11, 1265-66, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609
n.11, 625-26.
108 Id. at 607, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
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109

It also found that the system of financing edufundamental interest.
cation through the ad valorem property tax was based on the suspect
classification of wealth. Consequently, the state was required to show
a compelling interest to justify its present system of school financing. 11°
The Serrano decision was based upon both state and federal constitutional grounds. However, that part of the opinion concerning the
federal equal protection analysis was nullified by the Supreme Court's

subsequent decision in Rodriguez. The viability of the state equal protection argument remained unscathed by that decision. Rodriguez
necessitated that Robinson v. Cahill be decided on grounds other than
federal equal protection.
The education clause of New Jersey's constitution provided an
alternative to the federal equal protection arguments. In 1875, New
Jersey adopted a constitutional amendment providing for the legislative establishment and maintenance of a "thorough and efficient" system of public schools.1 1 This provision was enacted as a consequence
of the same political pressure which had resulted in the passage of the
state's first free public school law in 1871.112 The adoption of this constitutional amendment occurred at a time when public education was
principally funded by a statewide tax on realty, coupled with the opportunity of unrestricted local contribution. 113 As late as 1910, the
state was paying 67 per cent of the public schools' current expenses. 14
The New Jersey courts had an opportunity to interpret this constitutional provision in Landis v. Ashworth.115 In this case, the court
dealt with the power of local districts to supplement the state's level of
educational expenditures. Although the concept of equal facilities for
all school children was rejected, 116 the court recognized that the purpose of the 1875 amendment was
to impose on the legislature a duty of providing for a thorough and
efficient system of free schools, capable of affording to every child
such instruction as is necessary to fit it for the ordinary duties of
citizenship .... 117
109 Id. at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.

1l0 Id. at 614-15, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
111 N.J. CONsr. art. 8, § 4, If 1.
112 A State School Support Program for New Jersey 13 (State of New Jersey, State
Aid to School Districts Study Commission, Dec..19, 1968).
113 62 N.J. at 506, 303 A.2d at 290. (citing 1 MYERs, TIE STORY OF NEW JERSEY
458-60 (1945)).
114 118 N.J. Super. at 267, 287 A.2d at 210.
115 57 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
116 Id. at 512, 31 A. at 1018.
117

Id.
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Thus, at the inception of the Robinson complaint, there existed
an independent state constitutional basis upon which a claim for equal
educational opportunity could be based regardless of the interpretation
of the federal equal protection clause.
At the trial level, Robinson v. Cahill constituted a challenge of
both state and federal constitutional dimensions. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey, however, influenced both by Rodriguezs rejection of
the federal equal protection approach and the potential public policy
ramifications of a decision based on a state equal protection theory,
instead chose narrower grounds upon which to decide the case. The
court based its decision upon an analysis of the state constitutional
requirement that the legislature provide for the "maintenance and
support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools." ' s
It found that this mandate had not been met. 119 In so doing, the
supreme court based its decision on this state constitutional mandate
rather than grappling with such other issues as state equal protection,
which had been discussed at the trial level. This approach, based upon
a constitutionally mandated qualitative standard, emphasized the
difference in legal analysis between Rodriguez and Serrano vis-?i-vis
Robinson. To deny the Robinson plaintiffs relief would not simply
condemn property owners to higher tax rates. Instead, such a denial
of relief would have given judicial sanction to the continued existence
of inadequate facilities which were not only less than thorough and
efficient, but in fact dangerous to student health and safety.
The court's conclusion that the constitutional requirement for a
thorough and efficient educational system had not been met was based
on the actual discrepancies in dollar input per pupil and its resultant
educational impact.2 0 The problem was considered in these terms because expenditures proved to be the most visible criterion for measuring compliance by the state with the constitutional mandate.
In summary, Robinson stands for the proposition that the state's
obligation is to adopt a system of funding public education to insure
that the constitutional mandate of a thorough and efficient education
is met for every child attending public school. In so doing, the court
specifically left open for future resolution, the question of whether the
N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4, q 1.
119 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
120 Id. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295. The Robinson court recognized that the exact
meaning of the constitution's "thorough and efficient" mandate has never been ascertained. It directed the legislature to define the state's educational obligation and to
"compel the local school districts to raise the money necessary to provide that opportunity." Id. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297 (emphasis in original).
118
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equal protection guarantee of the New Jersey constitution would re12 1
quire all municipal services to be provided on an equal basis.

In spite of the diverse results and judicial reasoning in Rodriguez,
Serrano, and Robinson,'1 22 these decisions are consistent from a jurisprudential point of view. Each, in effect, has thrust responsibility on
the state legislatures to enforce state educational guarantees, even
when such compliance would necessitate thorough legislative reform
of the existing methods of financing and delivery of essential educational services.
V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

"Full state funding" is a system of school financing which could
comply with the court's order in Robinson. This approach requires the
state to adopt as its basic educational objective, the assumption of all
fiscal responsibilities for public education. 123 Moreover, the opportunity for limited additional local funding of public education is not
prohibited by this system. While it is obvious that local leeway could
re-introduce the inequities of the present system, by instituting such
safeguards as a limit of the local optional contribution, this danger
24
would be minimal.
The success of full state funding as a means of eliminating educational deprivation and equalizing educational opportunity depends
upon the level at which the state actually provides funds. Several variations of the plan have received consideration. A recently proposed

Maryland plan would guarantee a continuation of expenditures at the
121 Id. at 499-501, 303 A.2d at 286-87. "We point to the dimensions of the subject to
explain why we should not deal with it on the record of this case." Id. at 501, 303 A.2d
at 287. The court, however, recognized that "[clonceivably a State Constitution could be
more demanding." Id. at 490, 303 A.2d at 282. Thus, the state constitution's equal protection guarantees may be a valuable ground upon which future litigation in this area
may rest. See note 85 supra.
122 It is important to note the present status of the Robinson case. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey, on August 2, 1973, refused to grant three legislative officials leave
to extend time to file a petition for rehearing. Consequently, these legislators filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States which has since
been denied. 42 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1973). The Attorney General and Governor
of New Jersey, as well as the state education officials named as defendants in Robinson,
are not parties to the Supreme Court petition. In view of the case's judicial finality,
it is reasonable to expect that the New Jersey legislature will attempt compliance with
Robinson.
128 Levin, Alternatives to the Present System of School Finance: Their Problems and
Prospects, 61 GEo. L.J. 879, 914-18 (1973); EDUCATION COMM'N OF THE STATES, A LcisLATOR's GuIDE TO SCHOOL FINANcE 26-27 (Rep. No. 31, Feb., 1973).
124 NEW JERsEY TAX PoLicy CoMM., REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY TAX PoLicy COMMrrrEE, Part III, Service Levels and State Aids 44-45 (Feb. 23, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
SEARs REPORT, Part III].
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level of the highest spending school district of the preceding year,'1 25
with a cost of living allowance of 5 per cent where area conditions warrant. 2 6 In place of local property taxes, Maryland's proposed revenue
sources consist of corporate franchise taxes, a progressive individual and
corporate income tax, and a statewide property tax.127 Full state funding is the method also favored by New York's Fleischmann Commission.128 However, the New York plan would allow a greater variance
in expenditures. The level of funding of the lowest spending districts
would be raised to the spending level of the upper 65th percentile of the ranking districts, rather than adopting Maryland's test of a
5 per cent variation from the expenditures of the highest spending
district. 129 New Jersey's Sears Tax Policy Commission has also endorsed substantial state funding, 130 together with the promulgation by
the Commissioner of Education of a minimum standard of educational
quality.13'
Another proposed system which could be in harmony with the
Robinson mandate follows the power equalizing approach. 1 32 Under
this plan, the state would guarantee a given tax levy in a given tax
district to produce a set tax yield. Alternatively the state could set
the rate, set the tax yield, or establish a guaranteed level of funding
for each unit of need in a district. Under any of these proposals wealthier districts would still produce greater revenue than poorer ones.
However, according to the provisions of the power equalizing plan,
the excess would be distributed through a central state fund to the
poorer districts13
125 A Responsible Plan for the Financing, Governance and Evaluation of Maryland's Public Schools 71-72 (Citizens Comm'n on Maryland Gov't, Nov., 1971).
126 Id. at 79.
127 Id. at 80-81. The state of Maryland has recently enacted legislation which differs
in significant respects with that of the Committee's recommendations. The new statute
(Chapter 360, May 21, 1973) relies primarily upon a local property tax at the county
level for the state's county-wide school districts, and a net taxable income of each county
to finance public education. The plan calls for a state contribution to assure a minimal
education to all, and utilizes a power equalizing approach to achieve the desired level
of state funding contributions. 3 LAWS OF MD. 798-809 (1973).
128 1 NEw YORK STATE COMM'N ON THE QUALITY, COST, AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY EDUc., THE FLEISCHMANN REPORT 62 (1973).
129 Id. at 65.
130 SEARS REPORT, Part III, supra note 124, at 44.
131 Id.

132 For an analysis of power equalization see Report of the Citizens Union Comm. on
Educ. Fin., Financing Public Education in New York State: An Analysis of the Fleischmann Commission Report, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 6, 13-15 (1973).
138 EDUCATION COMM'N OF THE STATES, A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO SCHOOL FINANCE
29-30 (Rep. No. 31, Feb., 1973).
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Full state funding and power equalization are the most appropriate
financing programs presently available because they espouse the Robinson and Serrano principle of fiscal equity. However, the most politically
attractive plan might consist of a combination of several proposals. In
accord with the power equalization approach, the wealthier districts
would contribute more money to the statewide equalization percentages. Then, based on these percentages, these monies would be allocated
to those districts not capable of raising the funds required to attain the
thorough and efficient standard of educational quality. A realistic
educational program could be established, with the cost secured,
while at the same time preserving local control. Local leeway in the
form of add-ons, unless equalized by the state, would be closely
scrutinized or eliminated. In this manner the plan would closely approach the full state funding concept. Dollar equality in educational
financing could alternatively be achieved either by the state's assumption of educational costs, or through a state funded program permitting
a limited amount of local add-ons.
Unquestionably, a financing system compatible with Robinson
must assure a thorough and efficient system of free public schools.
This requires reconsideration of the need standards rejected in Mc84
The need criteria can be ascertained by assigning
Innis v. Shapiro.1
children a basic weight or value according to grade levels and socioeconomic background. These weights would be converted into financial
requirements to be supplied to the local school district. This process,
called weighted pupil-evaluation, is essential to reaching the Robinson
35
goals.1
184 293 F. Supp. 327, 329 & n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1968). See notes 10 & 12 supra and accompanying text.
185 Weighted pupil evaluation recognizes that educational costs vary with the type
of program offered, and the type of student involved in the program. The Bateman Plan
used weights primarily based on increased costs as a child advances through school grade
levels. The only other factor the Plan recognized was a weighting for each child whose
family received AFDC assistance for dependant children. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-2
(Supp. 1973-74); A State School Support Program for New Jersey 4-5 (State of New
Jersey, State Aid to School Districts Study Commission, Dec. 19, 1968). To arrive at the
number of weighted pupils, the total number of resident pupils in each category is multiplied by the assigned weighting factor. This quantity is used in determining the
amount of state aid a school district will receive. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-2 (Supp.
1973-74); A State School Support Program for New Jersey, supra at 43-45.
A determination of weighted pupils measures educational need equitably. However,
to comply with the Robinson mandate, the number of factors which are weighted must
be expanded. Greater consideration must be given to the educational needs of children
from the lower socio-economic levels, those with English language difficulties, those with
physical handicaps, and those suffering from mental retardation and emotional disturbance. These children start from a disadvantage. Consequently, it will cost more to provide them with the adequate education required by the state constitution. See notes 37
& 38 supra and accompanying text.
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Success in upgrading the quality of education is as difficult to
measure as is equity in taxation. Since the thorough and efficient
guarantee is qualitative, any plan which only directs increased educational expenditures to the poorer districts, without simultaneously improving the educational services, would miss the mark. Uniformity of
expenditures is not the goal. Achievement of a thorough and efficient
educational system depends on the peculiar needs of the students.
This, in turn, may require unequal dollar allocations. 18 6 Consequently,
the degree of local control and participation permissible is of great
importance. Careful attention must be given to establishing criteria for
determining legitimate local educational discretion.
With continued control and participation by the local districts,
there should be district accountability for any funds allocated to local
use. Without such accountability, any plan for a more equitable distribution of funds would not effectively guarantee substantially equal
distribution of educational quality. Conversely, efficient local use of
allocated educational dollars is necessary to insure the successful implementation of any statewide system of funding public education.
Realizing that present systems of state financing were not optimal,
and that suggestions for basic restructuring of state tax policies were
necessary, Governor Cahill of New Jersey issued an executive order
creating the New Jersey Tax Policy Committee. 37 This non-partisan
study group, known as the Sears Commission, was directed to conduct
an in-depth study of all levels of taxation in New Jersey, which in38
cluded the financing of public education.
Upon completing its investigation and research, the Commission
issued a report, a portion of which made specific recommendations for
the state financing of schools. 39 These recommendations, however,
were made before the culmination of the Robinson litigation. This
author believes that the proposed plan neither meets the requirements
of the Robinson court, nor takes into account the preceding considerations which are imperative to effective and constitutional school
funding.
The basic premise underlying the Sears Commission's recommendations is that "the State assume responsibility for all of the operating costs of a standard quality education.'

1 40

According to the proposed

plan, the Commissioner of Education is to make an annual determination of the educational cost per pupil. Each school district would then
136

Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 520, 303 A.2d 273, 297-98 (1973).
(1970).

137 Exec. Order No. 5, 1 LAws OF N.J. 1234-37

138 Id.
139 SEARs REPORT,
140

Id. at 44.

Part III, supra note 124, at 30-49.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

receive a sum equal to these costs with this amount multiplied by the
number of weighted pupils in that district. Any regional cost differences are added to that figure.1 4 1 Local spending, known as leeway,
would be permitted. However, the issue of local leeway must first be
submitted to, and approved by, the district's voters by referendum.
Money for these added expenditures would then be procured by raising
the local property tax. 42 The Commission has devised a formula by
which the ability of a district to provide these extra funds would not be
heavily dependent upon the wealth of that district. The formula takes
into account the average district wealth per pupil and then computes
a state contribution to the local leeway funds in relation to that
average. 148 The per pupil expenditure would be established by each
district, but any substantial increase from one year to the next would
be reviewable by the Commissioner of Education.14 4 Any district that
was spending more per pupil before the passage of the plan than the
expense-per-pupil level as thereafter established, would be permitted
to continue spending at that level without local voter approval. 45 The
Commissioner of Education would have the further responsibility of
developing a system to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of individual school districts and of publishing the results. If a district
continually failed to achieve sufficient educational progress, the Commissioner would then have authority to promulgate recommendations
46
to rectify the situation.
The funds to finance the plan would be obtained through a
bifurcated taxing scheme. One source would be a uniform state property tax; the other would consist of a state income tax and an expansion
of the sales tax.147 Several reasons were advanced by the Commission
for the retention of some form of property tax funding. These include:
(1) the fiscal stability of a property tax; (2) the avoidance of "tax
havens;" (3) the avoidance of "business windfalls" which would otherwise be realized by businesses presently paying property taxes; (4) the
possibility of using the funds raised through property taxes to
reduce the rates of non-property taxes; and (5) the anticipation of
increased federal contribution to school funding which might facilitate
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Id.
Id. at 44-45.
ld. at 45.
Id. at 44-45.
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Id. at 45.
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the reduction or elimination of the property tax. 1 4 The principal
argument raised in opposition to retaining the property tax was that
such a tax would impose a serious burden on the real property owners
149
which would inevitably be increased by the legislature.
The Sears Commission recommendations also alluded to the
advantages of a system of state financing of local school costs. These
included: (1) elimination of wasteful competition between school
districts; (2) reduction of "ratables zoning," which, in effect, keeps
people out of specified school districts; (3) increased support to state
housing policies encouraging growth of housing developments; (4)
facilitation of a balanced use of property and non-property taxes; (5)
elimination of unearned tax shelters in wealthy districts; (6) assurance
of adequate educational expenditures by all local school districts;
(7) encouragement of a constructive reorganization of contiguous
school districts; (8) encouragement of greater urban-suburban balance
of state population; and (9) assurance of equalization of educational
opportunity. 50
Since the Sears Commission proceeded under the assumption that
state funding would eliminate local control over such issues as teachers' salaries, it advocated establishing regional systems of collective
bargaining where regional representatives of the state would have jurisdiction over questions of salary and fringe benefits. 151 However, the
Commission urged the continued retention of local control over most
152
other administrative and planning functions.
The Sears Commission recommendations have called for a dramatic
departure from the manner in which New Jersey has historically
financed its system of public education. The Committee's work should
be commended for its recognition of the state's basic responsibility to
assume the operating cost of public education. 5 3 While in this regard,
the author believes that the Commission's recommendations represent
a significant step forward, they fail however, to meet the constitutional
demands that Robinson makes on the state's educational system. The
Sears Commission would guarantee only a "standard quality" education.154 Such a qualitative standard would merely provide students
Part III, supra note 124, at 46-47.
Id. at 46.
150 Id. at 43.
151 Id. at 46.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 44.
154 Id. A proposed bill would amend N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-4 (Supp. 1973-74).
The bill would require consideration of the constitution's qualitative standard in determining annual expenses per pupil. The bill states in pertinent part:
148 SEARS REPORT,
149
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with equal programs to achieve such basic skills, as reading, writing,
and arithmetic, as measured against the average existing in the
educational community at large. To the Robinson trial court, the
"thorough and efficient" concept connoted "completeness with attention to detail." 15 5 Thus, when the "thorough and efficient" standard
is attained, all ascertainable measures of educational value and quality
will have been met.
Tested against this far-reaching mandate, the Sears Commission
recommendations fall short of the mark, since it is the thorough and
efficient standard that must be met by legislative enactment. As a
consequence of this standard's far-reaching ramifications, it will be
continually tested and further defined in both administrative hearings
and in judicial actions, as the state's educational system becomes increasingly committed to the fulfillment of human potential. Thus, a
standard quality education will simply not suffice. 156
Moreover, in advocating restrictions of expenditures by school
districts from one year to the next, the Sears Commission effectively
restricts growth of educational systems and permits the perpetuation
of present inequities. Educational costs advance at such a rapid pace
that a 20 per cent annual increase would not allow for a meaningful
upgrading of program offerings. Instead, all districts should be permitted to increase their spending to a level which would provide for
a thorough and efficient education, and not be restricted to a maximum
percentage increase from year to year. At the same time, however,
that recommendation of the Sears Commission which would permit
a wealthier district to continue spending above the level established by a state supported program together with permissible addons should be deleted. As proposed, the permitted local leeway,
which would allow expenditures up to one-third beyond the state
funded portion of the program, would only bid-up the cost of education, thus assuring the continuation of the same inequities that exist
today. Local leeway should be kept to a power equalized 10 per cent
The State board shall annually determine, prior to September 1, a current
expense cost per pupil unit sufficient to support a thorough and efficient educational program ....
N.J. Assembly Proposed Comm. Substitute for Assembly, No. 1272, at 6 (1972) (emphasis
added).
155 118 N.J. Super. at 268, 287 A.2d at 211.
156 For a discussion of possible approaches to defining equal educational opportunity
see, A. WisE, RICH ScHooLs PooR SCHOOLS 143-59 (1968). The definition chosen would
have a direct bearing upon the resource allocation system utilized, as discussed in notes
123-33 supra and accompanying text. See generally Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and
Equal Protection, 38 HARv. EDuc. Ray. 635, 642-52 (1968).
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level and limited solely to the express purpose of local experimentation. If leeway is not controlled in this manner, a wealthy district
would have license to maintain a qualitatively superior school system
without contributing toward the development of a thorough and
efficient educational system for all school districts.
To achieve Robinson's mandate, a total abandonment of the Bateman Plan's system of weighted state contribution is necessary. 1 7 These
weights, which are based upon historical spending patterns, attempt
to account for the basic differences in educational costs, and consequently are prejudiced in favor of those districts which have traditionally had more money, and therefore have provided a superior
education. A fresh study of relevant factors which affect educational
needs and achievements must be undertaken and new weights established accordingly.
In addition, the Sears Commission blissfully ignored the problems
158
of capital expenditure programs to which Robinson addressed itself.
After a reading of the supreme court's opinion, it is the author's
opinion that the state must first assume all bonded indebtedness of
school districts, and then establish a list of capital priorities which it
must fully fund.
Supplementing the responsibilities assigned by the Sears Commission to local boards of education would be the task of devising prekindergarten programs, which would then be fully funded by the
state upon application by the local board. Such pre-school programs are
especially necessary if a thorough and efficient education is to be
provided to students who come from disadvantaged environments.
While the above recommendations have considered only the
revenue distribution formulas, the important area of revenue raising
157 The weighted pupil concept is one of several methods that have been proposed
to allocate resources to individual school districts. See note 135 supra. Other methods include: (1) state categorical aid grants targeted to students with various learning handicaps; (2) determinations based on an evaluation of a district's socio-economic characteristics; (3)determinations which vary with a district's ability to tax or with its taxing
effort; (4) determinations based upon educational needs established by the administering
of standardized scholastic achievement-type tests to all students within the school sys-

tem. See

EDUCATION COMM'N OF THE STATES,

A

LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO SCHOOL FINANCE 25-

26 (Rep. No. 31, Feb., 1973); 1 NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON THE QUALITY, COST, AND
FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY Euc., THE FLEtSCHMANN REPORT 67-69 (1973).

See generally Note, Equal Educational Opportunity: A Case for the Children, 46 ST.
JOHN'S L REv. 280, 312-18 (1971).

158 62 N.J. at 520, 303 A.2d at 297. The court stated that "[t]he State's obligation
includes as well the capital expenditures without which the required educational opportunity could not be provided." Id. For a discussion of the importance of capital outlay
necessary for educational delivery and the lack of judicial attention thereto, see Levin,
supra note 123, at 907 & n.l0.
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has not yet been discussed. However, a constitutionally acceptable
formula in conformity with Robinson should not be difficult to devise.
Preliminarily, it would seem that a statewide property tax is not
advisable. Such a tax is regressive. 15 9 It would place a heavy burden on
those who can least support it. The poorer districts struggle to raise a
tax yield sufficient to furnish a modicum of municipal and county
services, while the wealthier districts raise more tax revenues with
greater ease. A statewide property tax at the same percentage rates
would provide the wealthier districts with a better return in relation
to their tax valuation. The tax, in effect, would not be levied at a
uniform rate. 16 0
In addition, while dictum in Robinson indicates that a statewide
real property tax is constitutional, 161 such a conclusion is contrary to
the intent and language of the 1947 New Jersey constitution. That
document directs that the proceeds of a realty tax are to be spent ex1 62
clusively for the use of the taxing district in which they are raised.
The major alternative to a property tax is, of course, a statewide
personal income tax. Such a tax, at graduated rates of from 2 per cent
to a maximum of 14 per cent would have produced, according to
projections, at least one billion dollars in 1972.163 This projection in159 See Moon & Moon, The Property Tax, Governmental Services, and Equal Protection: A Rational Analysis, 18 VILL. L. REv. 527, 545-46 (1973).
The Governor's Blue Ribbon Commission which studied the causes of Newark's
civil disorders concluded:
The heavy reliance on property taxes to fund most governmental services in
New Jersey probably results in the most regressive tax system in the country.
GOVERNOR'S SELECT COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDER, STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

REPORT FOR

ACTION 52 (February, 1968).
Economists, however, disagree on the issue. For an opposing point of view see
Mieszkowski, On the Theory of Tax Incidence, 75 J. POL. ECON. 250, 259-60 (1967).
160 A statewide property tax, although undesirable, could be made more palatable
if "circuit breaker" provisions were incorporated within the plan. The legislature would
decide at which point the property tax burden was excessive, and that excess would be
recovered by the taxpayer either by way of credit on his state income tax return, or by
a direct cash rebate. For a more complete analysis of such a system see Levin, supra note
123, at 923 (referring to ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A CsacurrBREAKER ON PROPERTY TAX OVERLOAD (1971)).
161 62 N.J. at 502-05, 303 A.2d at 288-90.
162 N.J. CONsT. art. 8, § 1, l(a), provides in pertinent part:
Property shall be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform
rules. All real property . . . shall be assessed according to the same standard of
value . . . such real property shall be taxed at the general tax rate of the taxing
district in which the property is situated, for the use of such taxing district.
(emphasis added).
163 A Program for Progressive and Equitable Taxation 4 (New Jersey Coalition for
the Reordering of Priorities, Feb., 1972).
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cludes a total tax exclusion for families earning under $5,000 a year.164
The net effect of the proposed statewide personal income tax would
be to substantially reduce the amount of property taxes paid by
homeowners by approximately 60 per cent. 1 65 Relieved of primary

responsibility for the funding of education, property owners should be
required to pass along the benefits of their reduced taxes to tenants in
the form of reduced rents. Reduced property tax liability would also
have the beneficial effect of freeing funds for capital improvements in
apartment buildings. Moreover, single family dwellings would become
more desirable economically as a consequence of reduced property
taxes to owners.
In the absence of a property tax, the state should also provide for
a corporate recapture tax. Such a levy would raise, through business
taxation, some $434,000,000 presently spent on real estate taxes by business and industry which would otherwise be lost to the tax coffers.Iss
This tax would not be levied on all businesses at the same levels, but
instead would be adjusted to encourage industrial and commercial
development in hard-need areas.
VI.

CONCLUSION

With New Jersey in the vanguard, the promise of educational
equality and opportunity first enunciated in Brown moves closer to
fulfillment. That promise, long denied many children because of their
place of residence or their socio-economic status, will no longer go
unheeded. Educational opportunity, which has been disseminated on a
grossly unequal basis as a consequence of local property values, will
no longer be constitutionally tolerated. Robinson v. Cahil1167 recognized that educational output is related to dollar input. 6 8 It swept

away the unequal dispensation of a system of public education which
had as its basis, private wealth as reflected in local property taxes. The
Robinson court recognized the state's responsibility in the educational
process. That obligation is nothing less than that which the state
constitution mandates-a thorough and efficient education for every
child in the state's system of public schools.
Robinson's effect will be far reaching in its impact. Educational
dollars will become more readily available for such less advantaged
areas as Newark and Jersey City, with a consequent upgrading and
164 id.
165 Id.
I66 Id.

167 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
168 Id. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277.
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improvement of quality in those locales. Since the state has the
obligation of providing a thorough and efficient education to every
child, regardless of residence, more affluent communities will stand
alongside their less advantaged neighbors in raising these funds to
reach this standard. While the likelihood of disparities in quality
because of privilege and local wealth will thus be minimized, the
affluent communities can be assured that their children will continue
to receive a thorough and efficient education to which they too are
entitled. The possibility, in fact the need, for cooperation and communication among the urban, suburban, and rural communities of
the state will be enhanced. There will be a mingling of ideas and
forces dedicated to the actualization of human potential.
The importance of an intelligent and educated populace is selfevident. Education has a direct influence on one's capacity to effectively
participate in the democratic process. It is necessary to insure the
maintenance of society's values. It is essential. for the attainment of
the individual's prospects for a full and -rewarding life.16 9 The legislature must respond swiftly to the needs and demands of educational
funding. Unnecessary delay can only result in continued misapplication of important resources. More importantly, further delay deprives
this state's school children of their constitutional right to a thorough
and efficient education, which in contemporary society is a prerequisite if one is to achieve a full measure of ability.
The Robinson decision mandates that the state fulfill the constitutional requirement of a thorough and efficient education. The state
must embark upon an ongoing quest for both excellence and quality in
education. The legislature must now address itself to the realization of
this goal. Hopefully, New Jersey as well as those other states with a
qualitative guarantee for public education, 17 0 will press forward toward
the full realization of the human potential inherent in this mandate.
169 Kirp, supra note 156, at 642.
170 See note 90 supra for a listing of those states with constitutionally mandated
qualitative guarantees.

